United States and BRICS: Geopolitical Dynamics in 2025

Introduction

The enlargement of BRICS – originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – with new members (including Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and initially Argentina) marks a significant shift in the global geopolitical landscape. As of 2025, the expanded BRICS coalition (sometimes dubbed “BRICS+”) represents a huge share of the world’s population and economic output, rivaling traditional Western groupings. In fact, BRICS nations account for roughly half of the world’s population and around one-third of global GDP (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations) (Charted: Comparing the GDP of BRICS and the G7 Countries). By some measures, their combined GDP (especially in purchasing power terms) now matches or even surpasses that of the G7 economies ([ The BRICS Nations Reach a Crossroads

Table 1: BRICS vs G7 – Key Indicators (2024)

Indicator	BRICS (11 countries)	G7 (7 countries)
Share of World Population	~46% (approx. 3.7 billion) cfr.org	~10% (approx. 0.8 billion)
Share of World GDP (Nominal)	~29% (≈ $30.8 trillion) visualcapitalist.com visualcapitalist.com	~43% (≈ $45.9 trillion) visualcapitalist.com
Share of Global Oil Production	~43% (with Saudi, Russia, Iran) cfr.org	~20% (primarily US & Canada)
Military Alliance Structure	Loose (no formal alliance; divergent interests)	Formal (NATO, bilateral alliances)
Stance on Ukraine War	Divided (calls for peace, no joint sanctions on Russia)	Unified in support of Ukraine (sanctions on Russia)

Sources: IMF data via VisualCapitalist

Sources: IMF data via VisualCapitalist (Charted: Comparing the GDP of BRICS and the G7 Countries) (Charted: Comparing the GDP of BRICS and the G7 Countries); BRICS Summit reports (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils); population data from CFR (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations).

This report analyzes U.S.–BRICS dynamics in 2025 across political/diplomatic, economic, and military/security dimensions. It incorporates recent developments (primarily from 2024–2025), official statements from leaders on both sides, expert commentary, and scenarios for how these relations might evolve. Despite growing tensions – from war in Eastern Europe to rivalry in the Indo-Pacific – the picture is not simply one of binary confrontation. Many BRICS members maintain cooperative ties with Washington even as they forge new partnerships among themselves. The following sections explore these multifaceted relationships in depth.

Political and Diplomatic Dynamics

A Multipolar Push vs. the Western-led Order

BRICS was founded on the premise of creating a counterweight to Western dominance in global institutions (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations). By 2025, its members openly advocate for a “multipolar world order” in which U.S. and European influence is balanced by emerging powers. For example, at the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russian President Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping reiterated calls for a more just multipolar world order not dictated by the West (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). As one Russian analyst noted, BRICS provides “a space for interaction that bypasses Western states and institutions” – creating options for political and economic ties free of U.S./EU oversight (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). This reflects a growing confidence among non-Western countries to demand changes in global governance, fueled by shifts in economic and demographic power.

Importantly, most BRICS leaders insist the bloc is not a hostile alliance against the West. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has emphasized, “We do not want to be a counterpoint to the G7, G20 or the United States. We just want to organize ourselves.” (BRICS divisions re-emerge ahead of critical expansion debate | Reuters) His statement underscores that Brazil (and others like India and South Africa) prefer to use BRICS to amplify the Global South’s voice rather than to form an anti-U.S. front. In fact, the expanded BRICS now claims to be “the most consequential collective voice of the Global South,” channeling widespread discontent with the Western-led order (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). Many developing nations see BRICS as an inclusive forum (open to new emerging-economy members) in contrast to clubs like the G7 (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). This appeal was evident in 2024 when over 30 countries expressed interest in BRICS membership or partnership, interpreting the bloc’s growth as a sign of their own frustrations and aspirations (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils).

From Washington’s perspective, this trend is both a challenge and a wake-up call. U.S. officials publicly play down the notion of BRICS as a strategic threat, pointing to the internal diversity among its members. “This is a very diverse collection of countries…with differences of view on critical issues,” White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted, saying he does not see BRICS becoming a geopolitical rival to the U.S. (BRICS divisions re-emerge ahead of critical expansion debate | Reuters). Privately, however, there is recognition that the bloc’s expansion signals growing global South dissatisfaction with the status quo. A European analyst warned that Western nations should view the enlarged BRICS as “a wake-up call to listen carefully to the resentments, frustrations, and demands of the developing world,” rather than dismiss it as mere Chinese or Russian machinations (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). In other words, ignoring the underlying grievances that drive countries toward BRICS could erode U.S. influence. Western commentators (and even some officials) have urged the U.S. and Europe to counter the BRICS narrative by proactively supporting reforms in international institutions to give emerging nations a greater voice (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). It is telling that Russia and China – both permanent UN Security Council members – champion UN reform (expanding UNSC seats for developing powers), while the U.S. has cautiously endorsed the idea of adding India, Brazil, etc., but seen little progress.

Competing Diplomacies and Recent Developments

In 2024, multiple diplomatic events highlighted the push-and-pull between U.S. and BRICS influences:

BRICS Expansion (August 2023) – At the Johannesburg summit, BRICS leaders invited six new countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, and Argentina) to join in 2024. This first expansion since 2010 was celebrated by China and Russia as a win for a “multipolar world order” (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters). Notably, it brought U.S.-aligned Gulf partners (KSA, UAE, Egypt) into the fold alongside U.S. adversaries (Iran) – a mix that would have been “unthinkable until recently” (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council) (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). The inclusion of Iran, in particular, strengthened the anti-U.S. axis within BRICS by adding a second internationally-sanctioned nation (alongside Russia) (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). This outcome reflected Beijing and Moscow’s sway in the bloc and raised concern in Western capitals that BRICS could adopt a more antagonistic tone toward the U.S. (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council) (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). However, the expansion also widened internal differences – India and Brazil only grudgingly accepted certain candidates and remain wary of overt anti-West agendas. (In fact, India’s Prime Minister Modi initially pushed to exclude countries under sanctions – a criterion that would have barred Iran – and argued for economic qualification standards (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters) (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters). These divisions had to be finessed to achieve consensus on new members.) Argentina’s case was also illustrative: after a change of government in late 2023, Buenos Aires opted to decline membership, as the new president pivoted to a pro-U.S. stance (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). This underscores that BRICS entrants are not monolithic in their orientation; domestic politics and ties to the U.S. can still alter a country’s course. The U.S. officially responded coolly – “We are not looking at BRICS as evolving into some kind of geopolitical rival…,” Sullivan said, stressing Washington’s intent to maintain “strong positive relationships” with partners like India, Brazil, and South Africa regardless (BRICS divisions re-emerge ahead of critical expansion debate | Reuters). Yet, American strategists clearly took note of the bloc’s rising appeal. European Investment Bank President Werner Hoyer cautioned Western governments that they risk “losing the confidence of the Global South” if they don’t step up support for developing nations – a sentiment directly linked to the attractiveness of initiatives like BRICS expansion (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters).
G20 and Multilateral Forums (2023–24) – The dynamic between the U.S. and BRICS countries played out in venues like the G20. During India’s G20 presidency in 2023, New Delhi carefully balanced its roles: Prime Minister Modi courted Western investment and U.S. partnership (hosting President Biden for a state visit), even as he rallied G20 consensus around language on Ukraine that softened criticism of Russia (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). The New Delhi G20 declaration notably avoided naming Moscow as the aggressor, reflecting the influence of India, China, and others – much to the West’s frustration. In effect, BRICS members within the G20 acted as a moderating force on Western positions, highlighting a growing divide between the “Global North” and “Global South” perspectives. Likewise, at the United Nations, BRICS nations often coordinate or at least consult on key votes. In early 2024, during the Israel–Gaza war, BRICS members took a line at odds with Washington: Brazil (as UN Security Council president in October 2024) drafted a resolution calling for a humanitarian pause in Gaza that the U.S. vetoed, while China and Russia backed it (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations). This deepened the sense among developing countries that the U.S. was out of touch with global majority opinion on that conflict. South Africa and India joined calls for a ceasefire, reflecting a broader Global South consensus, even as the U.S. stood firmly with Israel. Such episodes have politically aligned BRICS states closer to prevailing Global South sentiment, in implicit contrast to U.S. stances.
U.S. Re-engagement Efforts – Aware of these trends, the Biden administration intensified diplomatic outreach to individual BRICS countries in 2023–2024. High-profile visits – e.g. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen each visiting Beijing, Biden meeting India’s Modi and Brazil’s Lula – aimed to keep lines of communication open. President Biden publicly affirmed that the U.S. seeks “competition without conflict” with China and is not seeking a new Cold War. He also welcomed India’s rise as a leader of the Global South, and courted Brazil on areas of common interest like climate change and labor rights. These efforts yielded mixed results: U.S.–China relations remained tense (due to espionage incidents, Taiwan, tech sanctions), but by late 2024 Xi and Biden did agree to restore military and climate dialogues (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). U.S.–India relations, on the other hand, reached new heights of cooperation, even as India still refuses to join Western sanctions on Russia. With Brazil, Biden and Lula launched a joint initiative on workers’ rights and deforestation, showing that pragmatic alliances cut across the notional East-West divide. Washington’s strategy has essentially been to deal with BRICS members bilaterally, leveraging areas of mutual benefit, rather than treating BRICS as a unified bloc. This is partly why Sullivan downplayed BRICS as “a diverse collection of countries” – the U.S. hopes the bloc’s internal divisions will limit any collective anti-U.S. orientation (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters) (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters). Indeed, divisions exist (e.g. India-China border disputes, Brazil’s and India’s friendships with the West, etc.), but common grievances (like opposition to Western sanctions and interventionism) continue to bind BRICS members on certain issues.

In summary, the political diplomacy between the U.S. and BRICS in 2025 is a delicate dance. BRICS countries are asserting themselves – calling for reforms in the UN, IMF/World Bank, and other institutions to dilute Western dominance – and often coordinating positions (for example, pushing for peace negotiations in Ukraine, resisting isolation of Russia, and demanding more development financing for the South). The U.S. and its allies, while militarily and economically dominant in the traditional sense, have had to acknowledge this groundswell. As one expert observed, the expanded BRICS “should be read as a sign of growing discontent with the current Western-led global order” (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). In response, Western leaders face pressure to “listen and reform” rather than dismiss these concerns (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). How this tug-of-war plays out will shape international politics: a cooperative approach (engaging emerging powers in “managed reform” of the global system (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils)) could ease tensions, whereas a zero-sum approach (with both sides hardening into rival camps) could deepen geopolitical rifts.

Economic Dynamics: Competition and Interdependence

Trade, Investment, and Economic Tensions

Economically, the U.S. and BRICS countries are both rivals and partners, creating a multifaceted landscape of tension and interdependence. On one hand, several BRICS members are actively seeking to reorient trade and finance away from U.S. dominance; on the other hand, the United States remains a key economic partner for many of these nations. This paradox defines their economic relations in 2025.

Trade Interdependence: Despite political frictions, trade between the U.S. and major BRICS economies has remained robust or even grown. For instance, U.S.–China goods trade hit an all-time high of $690 billion in 2022 (What cold war? U.S. trade with China hits new high – POLITICO), a staggering figure highlighting how deeply entwined the two economies are. American consumers continue to rely on Chinese manufacturing, and China benefits from the U.S. export market, even as both governments spar over tariffs and technology restrictions. Similarly, India’s trade with the U.S. reached a record ~$160 billion in 2023, making the U.S. India’s largest trading partner (United States (USA) and India (IND) Trade – OEC World). India enjoys a surplus via IT services and exports, while importing American products – a sign of deepening ties. Brazil and South Africa also count the U.S. among their top trade partners (the U.S. is Brazil’s second-largest export market after China, buying everything from soybeans to aircraft). Saudi Arabia and the UAE have longstanding oil and investment links with the U.S., and Egypt depends on U.S. and Western markets for exports like textiles and tourism. In short, economic globalization has bound the U.S. and many BRICS members together, restraining how far decoupling can realistically go. As a senior U.S. official put it, “the United States does not seek to decouple from China” entirely, but rather to “de-risk” and diversify supply chains (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council) – a strategy that acknowledges continued trade while reducing over-reliance on any single source (a lesson reinforced by pandemic disruptions).

Strategic Decoupling and Sanctions: Yet, areas of sharp economic tension persist. The U.S. has imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine war, cutting Russia off from dollar financing and advanced Western technology. This has virtually frozen U.S.–Russia commerce (which was modest to begin with) and forced Moscow to pivot toward China, India, and others for critical markets and supplies. Washington has warned countries against helping Russia evade sanctions, creating diplomatic headaches with partners like South Africa, Turkey, the UAE, and even India (which dramatically increased purchases of discounted Russian oil). Meanwhile, Iran remains under a U.S. sanctions regime – but as a new BRICS member, Tehran is bolstered by the willingness of China and Russia (and to a lesser extent India) to do business outside the dollar system. China, for its part, faces U.S. export controls on high-end semiconductors and investment restrictions in sensitive tech sectors. This tech war intensified in 2023–2024, with the U.S. citing national security to limit China’s access to cutting-edge chips and equipment. Beijing has decried these moves as economic coercion and has retaliated with its own restrictions (for example, on exports of rare earth metals crucial to electronics). The result is a partial decoupling in strategic sectors – especially technology and defense-related industries – even as general trade flows continue. The U.S. also passed the CHIPS Act to on-shore semiconductor manufacturing and pursued “friendshoring” of supply chains to partners like India, Vietnam, and Mexico to reduce dependence on China. From the BRICS perspective, such actions reinforce the desire to “de-Westernize” their economic ecosystems, so they are less vulnerable to U.S. policy shifts.

De-Dollarization Efforts: A major economic thrust of BRICS in recent years has been to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. Spurred by the freezing of Russia’s dollar reserves in 2022 and long-standing complaints about dollar hegemony, BRICS governments have increased trade settlement in local currencies and expanded currency swap lines. At the 2023 summit, members highlighted the “irreversible process of de-dollarization” – as President Putin put it, this trend is “gaining momentum” (BRICS divisions re-emerge ahead of critical expansion debate | Reuters). The bloc agreed to encourage use of local currencies in trade and financial transactions (BRICS divisions re-emerge ahead of critical expansion debate | Reuters). For example, China has been signing deals to settle oil and gas sales in yuan (one notable 2023 deal had Chinese currency used for LNG trade between China and the UAE). India began buying Russian oil in rupees, and Brazil’s banks expanded yuan trade financing for exports to China. While talk of a common BRICS currency made headlines, the 2023 summit did not create any such currency, and experts remain skeptical of that idea (BRICS divisions re-emerge ahead of critical expansion debate | Reuters). Instead, the focus is on strengthening institutions like the New Development Bank (NDB) – the BRICS’ own multilateral lender – to provide loans in local currencies and thereby bypass dollar-based systems (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters). The NDB (headed by former Brazilian leader Dilma Rousseff) has already added new members (Bangladesh, UAE, Egypt) and is courting Saudi Arabia’s entry (New Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank Strengthen …) (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). By offering an alternative source of development finance, the NDB and arrangements like the BRICS Contingent Reserve (a pool to support members in balance-of-payments trouble) aim to reduce Global South dependence on U.S.-led institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Western analysts acknowledge the motive: BRICS expansion is partly due to “a lackluster Western response to low-income countries’ needs” – members argue that if the IMF/World Bank won’t reform quickly, they must “rebalance the global order” themselves (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters) (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters). Still, creating a true parallel financial system is a tall order. Even officials like Yellen maintain that the dollar’s role is safe for now, given trust in U.S. financial markets. Experts say BRICS attempts to substantially “edge out the U.S. dollar” will be an uphill battle due to the dollar’s entrenched network effects and the bloc’s internal differences (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations).

Energy and Commodities: The economic relationship also features strategic competition in energy markets. BRICS includes some of the world’s top oil producers (Saudi Arabia, Russia, and now Iran) and top consumers (China, India). Coordination among these players can influence global oil prices – much to the concern of Washington. In 2023, Saudi Arabia and Russia (as OPEC+ leaders) agreed to cut oil production to prop up prices, over U.S. objections. This contributed to higher gasoline prices that frustrated the Biden administration (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations). The inclusion of Saudi and the UAE in BRICS effectively means the bloc has sway over about 42% of global oil supply (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). Some analysts warn this “gives [BRICS] relevancy in the geopolitics of the global oil market,” potentially allowing members to coordinate energy policy in ways unfriendly to U.S. interests (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). However, energy interdependence cuts both ways: the U.S. itself is a top oil producer and still a significant consumer, and it works closely with Saudi Arabia and others through longstanding partnerships. Notably, throughout 2023 the U.S. sought to mend ties with Saudi Arabia (after prior strains) partly to ensure stability in oil markets. By late 2023 there were talks of a U.S.-brokered Saudi–Israel normalization deal (in exchange for U.S. security guarantees and energy cooperation), which shows Saudi’s dual-track diplomacy – engaging with BRICS but also negotiating with Washington. This exemplifies how BRICS members hedge their bets: as one Atlantic Council expert observed, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi see BRICS membership as a “hedge against the United States” – a way to diversify partnerships, not outright replace the U.S. (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council) (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). For commodity-hungry BRICS economies like China and India, having oil-rich friends inside the club is advantageous, but it doesn’t negate their trade with the U.S. or U.S. allies. In other domains, BRICS expansion also boosts collective clout: with Argentina (a top lithium source) initially invited, the bloc eyed critical minerals for the green transition (Charted: Comparing the GDP of BRICS and the G7 Countries). Even though Argentina’s new government froze its BRICS entry, the symbolism remains – BRICS states aim to leverage their natural resources collectively in global markets.

Global Initiatives and Parallel Projects: Economically, the U.S. and its allies have started offering alternative initiatives to compete with China/BRICS-led projects. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s vast infrastructure lending program (which marked its 10th anniversary in 2023), has seen participation from many BRICS and developing countries. The U.S. belatedly responded by spearheading the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) with G7 partners, pledging hundreds of billions for infrastructure in the developing world. In late 2023, at India’s G20 Summit, President Biden joined Modi and others to announce a new India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor – a grand plan to connect South Asia with the Middle East and Europe via rail and ports (The G20 is divided — and Brics stands to gain – UnHerd). This was widely interpreted as a counterweight to China’s BRI, aimed at providing an alternative trade route and deepening economic ties between some BRICS members (India, Saudi, UAE) and the U.S./EU. If realized, such projects could strengthen U.S.–BRICS economic alliances (at least with the more Western-friendly members) and integrate supply chains in ways that diminish China’s dominance. However, these plans remain nascent. Meanwhile, China continues expanding its economic influence: in Africa, Chinese trade and investment far outstrip America’s, and even U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia have signed major contracts with Chinese firms (e.g. Huawei building 5G networks in the Gulf). Thus, the economic contest is about who will set the rules and reap the benefits of growth in the Global South. BRICS nations frequently argue that Western sanctions and protectionism (like U.S. steel tariffs or EU carbon taxes) hurt developing economies. Western officials counter that China’s lending can be predatory (“debt-trap diplomacy”) and that the West offers more sustainable, transparent investment. As of 2025, many countries are taking a “multi-aligned” approach economically – happily receiving Chinese funds for infrastructure while also seeking U.S. investment and access to Western markets.

In summary, **U.S.–BRICS economic relations in 2025 are characterized by selective cooperation and strategic divergence. The U.S. enjoys strong bilateral trade and investment links with several BRICS members (notably India, Brazil, and the Gulf states), creating a thick web of mutual interests. At the same time, Washington is confronted by a BRICS-led push to rewrite the rules of global finance – one that, if successful in the long term, could weaken the dollar’s primacy and U.S. economic leverage. For now, the dollar-centric system remains dominant (over 80% of global trade is still invoiced in USD or EUR), and BRICS unity on economic policy is far from solid. Indeed, internal rifts (e.g., India and Brazil’s reluctance to antagonize Western investors or jeopardize their own access to finance) act as a brake on any drastic economic decoupling from the West (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council) (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). Experts widely agree that BRICS “ambitions to create its own currency and…alternative institutions face potentially insurmountable challenges.” (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations). However, the direction of change is clear – incremental steps toward a more multipolar economic order are underway, and the U.S. is paying close attention. How Washington navigates issues like debt relief for the Global South, reform of the World Bank/IMF, and trade access for developing nations could determine whether countries continue gravitating toward BRICS economic platforms or find satisfaction within the existing U.S.-led system (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters).

Military and Security Relations

Security Alignments and Defense Partnerships

In the security realm, the relationship between the United States and BRICS nations is defined by competing alliances and shifting partnerships. Unlike the U.S. and its NATO allies, BRICS is not a military alliance and has no mutual defense pact. Its members’ security ties with the U.S. vary widely – from open rivalry (U.S. vs Russia and Iran), to cautious competition (U.S. vs China), to partnership (U.S. with India, Brazil, South Africa to some extent, and historically with the Gulf states). The period 2024–2025 has seen these alignments tested by ongoing conflicts and strategic posturing:

United States vs. Russia: The most stark confrontation is between Washington and Moscow due to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. By 2025, the war in Ukraine remains unresolved, and the U.S. leads a coalition providing massive military aid to Kyiv while trying to isolate Russia internationally. This proxy war has severely strained U.S.–Russia diplomatic contacts (arms control talks are frozen, and the risk of direct escalation is an ongoing concern). Russia, a core BRICS member, has used the BRICS platform to push back: Moscow touts that it still has friends and is “not isolated internationally”, as evidenced by Putin’s warm reception in BRICS and other Global South forums (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). In 2024, Russia even leveraged the BRICS summit to play peacemaker within the bloc – facilitating a meeting between Xi Jinping and India’s Modi (their first in years) to ease China–India border tensions (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). For the U.S., however, Russia’s BRICS engagement is seen as a way for Putin to circumvent Western pressure and find alternative avenues for arms deals, technology, and diplomatic legitimacy. Russia has indeed deepened defense ties with fellow BRICS members China and India (though in very different ways) since the war: China has conducted frequent joint military exercises with Russia, and India has continued to buy large volumes of Russian weapons (even as it diversifies sourcing). Washington has tried to counter this by persuading India to buy American weapons instead – for example, in 2024 the U.S. approved the sale of advanced MQ-9B drones to India and co-production of jet engines in India, moves aimed at weaning India off Russian arms over time. Still, India values its defense ties with Russia (for strategic autonomy and due to legacy systems), so the U.S. faces an uphill battle in fully displacing Russia on that front.
United States vs. China: The U.S.–China strategic rivalry intensified throughout the early 2020s and remains the pivotal great-power contest. While they are not at war, both nations are expanding and modernizing their militaries, and tensions run high in the Indo-Pacific. Key flashpoints include the South China Sea (where China’s militarization of disputed islands and U.S. “freedom of navigation” patrols frequently intersect), and Taiwan. By 2025, Taiwan’s status looms as a potential trigger for conflict – the U.S. has boosted arms sales and high-level political support to Taipei, and China’s PLA regularly conducts large-scale drills simulating a blockade or invasion of the island. U.S. officials describe China as the “pacing challenge” for the U.S. military, and have organized new coalitions in response. Notably, the Quad (U.S., India, Japan, Australia) and AUKUS (U.S., UK, Australia – focusing on nuclear submarine tech) are American-led partnerships aimed at deterring China. Here we see interesting crossover: India (a BRICS founder) is also a key part of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy (the Quad). India cooperates with the U.S. and allies on maritime security and intelligence to check Chinese influence, even as it remains in BRICS alongside China. This exemplifies India’s non-aligned but multi-partner strategy. For China, BRICS and related groupings (like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) serve to counterbalance U.S.-centric alliances. Chinese officials routinely criticize the U.S. for “Cold War mentality” and forming “exclusive blocs” like AUKUS, arguing these threaten regional stability. In response, China has increased defense collaboration with Russia (joint bomber patrols, naval drills) and with countries wary of the U.S. (for example, China held military exercises with Iran). The Gulf states’ entry into BRICS also has a security dimension: while Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain nominal U.S. security partners (hosting U.S. military bases and buying American weapons), they are expanding defense ties with China and Russia too. The UAE, for instance, has purchased Chinese armed drones and reportedly considered hosting a Chinese naval facility – something the U.S. strongly warned Abu Dhabi against. Saudi Arabia has engaged in joint military exercises with China and is exploring Chinese missile technology. These moves signal that even traditional U.S. allies are seeking strategic flexibility by engaging with America’s rivals.
Alliances and Commitments: The U.S. maintains a far-reaching alliance system that does not directly include any BRICS nation except (arguably) South Africa as a minor non-NATO ally during the Cold War and Brazil in WWII (both are now more independent). However, Egypt (a new BRICS member) has been a major recipient of U.S. military aid and is designated a Major Non-NATO Ally, as are Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This means several BRICS members have formal or informal security ties with Washington, even as they join hands with Russia and China in other arenas. This overlapping network can produce contradictions. For example, in February 2023, South Africa hosted a trilateral naval exercise (“Mosi II”) with Russia and China, coinciding with the one-year anniversary of the Ukraine invasion. Pretoria insisted it was routine training and part of its non-aligned stance (South Africa’s naval exercise with Russia, China raises Western alarm | Reuters) (South Africa’s naval exercise with Russia, China raises Western alarm | Reuters), but Western partners were alarmed. Western diplomats in South Africa openly “condemned the exercise” and warned it could “endanger important relations with Western partners.” (South Africa’s naval exercise with Russia, China raises Western alarm | Reuters) (South Africa’s naval exercise with Russia, China raises Western alarm | Reuters) The South African government pushed back, saying “like any sovereign state, [we have] a right to conduct foreign relations in line with [our] national interests” (South Africa’s naval exercise with Russia, China raises Western alarm | Reuters). This incident typifies how U.S. and European officials have reacted with concern as BRICS countries expand military ties among themselves. It also shows BRICS members asserting strategic autonomy. Similarly, in the Middle East, Iran’s integration into BRICS complicates U.S. security calculations – Iran is hostile to U.S. forces in the Gulf and backs militias that target U.S. interests, yet it now sits in the same club as U.S. partners like the UAE. There is speculation that Iran’s presence in BRICS will lead to greater military technology cooperation with Russia (building on Iran supplying drones to Russia for Ukraine) and possibly with China. If Iran, Russia, and China coordinate more on naval activities in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf, it could challenge the U.S. Navy’s traditional dominance there. Indeed, reports emerged of a Russia-China-Iran joint naval drill in late 2023, which was observed with caution by the U.S. (South Africa Observes as Russia, China, and Iran Hold Naval Drill).

Conflicts, Flashpoints, and Tensions

Multiple conflict zones and flashpoints in 2024–2025 illustrate the complex U.S.–BRICS security dynamic:

Ukraine War: Virtually all BRICS nations (except perhaps Brazil) have been reluctant to criticize Russia’s invasion outright. China and South Africa abstained or opposed Western resolutions against Russia at the UN, India has called for dialogue but never condemned Moscow, and Brazil’s Lula has controversially suggested “both Ukraine and Russia” bear responsibility and offered to mediate. This stance has angered U.S. and European officials, who see it as undermining the pressure campaign on Russia. The U.S. has tried carrots and sticks: praising India’s humanitarian aid to Ukraine and Brazil’s peace efforts, while also quietly warning that any material support to Russia (for instance, arms or sanction evasion) would have consequences. A flashpoint occurred in May 2023 when the U.S. Ambassador accused South Africa of loading weapons onto a Russian ship (the Lady R incident) – a charge South Africa denied after an inquiry, but which led to diplomatic friction and market jitters about sanctions (South Africa’s naval exercise with Russia, China raises Western alarm | Reuters) (South Africa’s naval exercise with Russia, China raises Western alarm | Reuters). Such episodes underscore a trust deficit: the U.S. suspects some BRICS partners might covertly aid Russia, while those countries resent what they perceive as U.S. bullying. Moving into 2025, if the Ukraine war continues, these tensions will persist. A potential escalation scenario – like Russia using tactical nuclear weapons or a direct NATO-Russia clash – could force BRICS nations into harder choices, but for now they cling to non-alignment, which U.S. commentators describe as “multi-alignment” – countries that were once partners or non-aligned [are] becoming increasingly multi-aligned (West tells Global South ‘you can’t be neutral’ in Ukraine war: You are either with us, or against us – Geopolitical Economy Report) (West tells Global South ‘you can’t be neutral’ in Ukraine war: You are either with us, or against us – Geopolitical Economy Report), picking and choosing issues on which to side with the West or with Russia/China.
Taiwan and East Asia: Though not directly involving other BRICS members, a conflict over Taiwan would pit the U.S. against China, and likely test BRICS unity. Russia would back China’s position (as Putin did verbally, supporting the one-China principle), and others might officially call for peace but be forced to lean one way. The U.S. has explicit laws (Taiwan Relations Act) supporting Taiwan’s self-defense, and has been steadily increasing military aid and training for Taiwan. In 2024, there were several close encounters between U.S. and Chinese forces near Taiwan and in the South China Sea – any accident or miscalculation could spiral. The Pentagon’s 2024 annual report on China’s military noted Beijing’s rapid nuclear arsenal expansion and ability to potentially blockade Taiwan in the coming years. In turn, China sees U.S. reconnaissance operations and alliance build-ups as provocation. While other BRICS like India or Brazil are not directly involved, a U.S.-China military crisis would reverberate globally, potentially forcing them to take diplomatic stances. India might quietly support the U.S. (due to its own China threat), whereas Russia would overtly support China. This illustrates how BRICS could fracture in a major East-West war scenario – a fact not lost on U.S. strategists who count on at least some BRICS members (India, maybe Brazil) to distance themselves from China in such an event.
Middle East and Terrorism: The U.S. has traditionally been the main security guarantor in the Middle East, but here too BRICS entries signal change. The China-brokered détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 surprised Washington and showed Beijing’s growing political clout. Following that, both Riyadh and Tehran joined BRICS. If China and Russia continue to act as “security providers” – for instance, selling advanced weapons or providing security assurances – the U.S. may find its influence in the Gulf declining. However, the 2024 Israel–Hamas war demonstrated that the U.S. is still the go-to power in crises: Washington worked intensely (albeit with mixed success) to manage the conflict, while BRICS nations collectively called for ceasefire and humanitarian aid. India and China both criticized Israel’s strikes on civilians, breaking somewhat from the U.S. stance of full support to Israel. This highlighted a divergence: Global South/BRICS opinion was largely sympathetic to Palestinians, while the U.S. firmly backed its Israeli ally. Such differences can strain U.S. relations with BRICS partners – e.g., public sentiment in South Africa, Brazil, and much of the Muslim world (including BRICS member Indonesia, which is not yet a full member but now a BRICS “partner country”) was against the U.S. position on Gaza (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). In counterterrorism, countries like India and China do share concerns (both have suffered extremist violence), and there is some cooperation in forums like the SCO. But if the U.S. is seen as too one-sided on issues like Israel-Palestine, BRICS solidarity on “non-interference” and “sovereignty” principles grows stronger in opposition.
Africa and Latin America: The U.S. and BRICS also quietly compete for influence in Africa and Latin America. Russia’s private military presence (the Wagner Group) in Africa and Chinese base ambitions are watched closely by the U.S. In 2024, as new military coups occurred in West Africa (Mali, Niger, etc.), Russian flags appeared in the streets – a symbolic snub to France and indirectly the U.S./West. While those nations are not BRICS, the “anti-Western” currents in Africa create a more favorable environment for BRICS messaging about sovereignty and development aid without strings. South Africa, the only African BRICS member so far (with Egypt, Ethiopia joining), often speaks for Africa’s desire for a reduced Western military footprint on the continent. In Latin America, Brazil and potentially Argentina (though now under a pro-U.S. leader) champion a foreign policy not subordinate to Washington (echoing the history of the Non-Aligned Movement). The U.S. Southern Command keeps an eye on rising Chinese arms sales and port projects in Latin America, wary of any security implications (such as a rumored Chinese listening post in Cuba in 2024). BRICS membership for Argentina was expected to draw the country a bit closer to China/Russia, but with President Javier Milei (a staunch pro-American, anti-communist figure) taking office, Argentina paused its BRICS participation (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). This sudden reversal actually pleased Washington, as it signaled that not all in the “Global South” are tilting toward the BRICS orbit – internal politics still matter greatly.

In aggregate, the military/security dynamic is one where the U.S. still holds most of the cards in terms of hard power and formal alliances, but BRICS countries are finding ways to cooperate militarily outside U.S. oversight. Joint exercises like Russia-China-South Africa’s naval drills (South Africa’s naval exercise with Russia, China raises Western alarm | Reuters), or prospective BRICS defense dialogues, would have been improbable a decade ago. Now they are becoming regular, if still limited, occurrences. The U.S. view, as articulated by analysts, is that BRICS “is not aiming to build a new order that condones Russia’s actions” or fundamentally overturn the current security order (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). In other words, even countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa do not endorse Russian aggression or Chinese military expansion, despite being in BRICS (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). This places some implicit limits on BRICS as a strategic bloc. For instance, China and Russia’s “no limits” partnership has limits – China is reportedly uncomfortable with some Russian behavior (a poll showed only 27% of Chinese citizens support Russia’s actions in Ukraine) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils), and Moscow’s cozying up to North Korea (for weapons trades) likely unnerves Beijing due to regional instability (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). These cracks suggest BRICS will not transform into a unified military front against the West. Nonetheless, the U.S. must contend with a geopolitical landscape where its former security clients are increasingly “playing both sides.” Saudi Arabia can buy U.S. Patriot missiles and Chinese ballistic missiles; India can do naval drills with Quad allies one month and army drills with Russia the next. This fluidity is new – a departure from the clearer blocs of the Cold War.

Expert Commentary and Possible Scenarios

Geopolitical analysts worldwide have been studying the U.S.–BRICS dynamic and sketching potential futures. A consensus is that we are at an inflection point: if managed well, a multipolar order need not descend into hostile blocs, but if mismanaged, the risk of a de facto “Cold War II” increases. Below are some insights from experts and plausible scenarios for the coming years:

The “Wake-Up Call” Scenario: Many commentators see the rise of BRICS as a wake-up call for the West to address legitimate grievances of the Global South. In this scenario, the U.S. and allies would undertake meaningful reforms to the global financial architecture (e.g. giving emerging economies more voting power in the IMF/World Bank, expanding the G7 or UNSC to include BRICS heavyweights). By acknowledging multipolar realities and sharing power, the West could undercut the more antagonistic narrative pushed by Moscow and Beijing. As one expert argues, it is “ridiculous that two UNSC members, Russia and China, call for a more representative global order” while Western powers drag their feet (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). The West should “engage emerging powers in discussions on managed reform” and exploit contradictions between BRICS members who don’t actually want a full break with the West (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). If this path is taken, we might see a less confrontational outcome: BRICS continues to exist but as one influence among many, and U.S.–BRICS cooperation on common challenges (climate change, pandemics, etc.) improves. In effect, the energy of BRICS would pressure Western-led institutions to be more inclusive, addressing global South discontent before it hardens into outright alignment against the West.
The “Fragmented but Peaceful Coexistence” Scenario: Another possibility is that U.S.–BRICS relations remain somewhat fragmented, with selective partnerships and rivalries coexisting. In this scenario, no broad Cold War-style bloc forms; instead, each relationship is compartmentalized. For example, the U.S. continues to strengthen ties with India (drawing it further into the Western camp on technology and defense) even as India stays in BRICS and SCO for its own interests. Brazil might similarly pursue its independent foreign policy – not joining Western sanctions on Russia or China-bashing, but also not significantly undermining the U.S., thus remaining a “friend of all.” Saudi Arabia and the UAE could maintain their U.S. security partnerships while also investing through BRICS frameworks. Essentially, every BRICS country would hedge: cooperating with the U.S. where convenient and with China/Russia where beneficial. This is arguably the current state of affairs, and it could persist. The upside of this scenario is a form of status quo stability – no sharp collapse in U.S. relations with, say, India or Saudi, despite their BRICS membership. The downside is that global governance might suffer from lack of unity: forums like the G20 could become arenas of deadlock if BRICS vs G7 positions calcify on issues like debt relief or climate finance (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council) (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). Still, major conflict is avoided and a pragmatic balancing act continues. Analysts note that many BRICS members “are not interested in aggravating relations with the West”, as Lukyanov wrote, and simply want options beyond U.S./EU mechanisms (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). As long as Washington provides those options (e.g. development aid, investment, security cooperation), these countries will likely keep one foot in the Western camp.
The “BRICS Bloc vs. West” Scenario: A more pessimistic (but not impossible) outcome is one where BRICS solidifies into a cohesive geopolitical bloc openly opposing Western policies. This might happen if internal moderates like India or Brazil lose influence or if global crises force polarization. In this scenario, China, Russia, and Iran (the hardliners) drive BRICS to take common stands directly against U.S. interests – for example, coordinating cyber defenses and alternative internet infrastructure separate from U.S. control, or jointly opposing U.S. military basing by offering their own security guarantees to smaller states. Some experts warn that with Russia chairing BRICS in 2024, the bloc could take a sharper “anti-West focus, including attempts to edge out the U.S. dollar” (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations). If BRICS countries started voting as a bloc in the UN, always siding with Russia/China on contentious issues, it would effectively create an “Eastern coalition.” The addition of more sanctioned/authoritarian states (imagine BRICS inviting Syria, Venezuela, or others in the future) could further tilt it into an explicit anti-West club. The U.S. and Europe would then respond by doubling down on their own alliances – a world of G7/NATO vs BRICS/Shanghai Cooperation Organization spheres could emerge. Non-aligned countries would be pressured to choose sides, reminiscent of the Cold War binary. Most analysts believe such a hard decoupling is unlikely in the near term because of the many cleavages within BRICS and the high costs for members like India or Saudi Arabia to alienate the West. Still, if, say, a major war involving the U.S. and China broke out (over Taiwan, for instance), it could catalyze this bloc logic rapidly. Think tanks like RAND and others have gamed out worst-case scenarios of a two-bloc world: technology standards splitting (Chinese vs Western systems), financial systems bifurcating, and global institutions paralyzed. Global trade would shrink and proxy conflicts could multiply. This is generally seen as a lose-lose scenario globally – which is why even Beijing and Washington profess they do not seek a new Cold War.
The “Internal Fracture” Scenario (BRICS Weakens): Another possibility is that BRICS’ internal contradictions grow and the grouping loses momentum, easing pressure on U.S.–BRICS relations. Signs of strain are evident: India and China’s border rivalry, historical mistrust between Iran and the Gulf Arabs, Brazil’s ambivalence about upsetting the U.S., etc. If these differences prevent BRICS from acting in concert, the bloc could become more symbolic than real. An expert noted that “with expansion, internal differences…may widen, with negative implications for cohesion” (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). For instance, if India perceives BRICS drifting too far toward a China-Russia anti-West agenda, it might quietly distance itself or block consensus (New Delhi already did so in 2023 until its concerns were met (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters) (BRICS expansion faces eleventh hour hurdle as divisions persist | Reuters)). Brazil might focus more on ties with the EU (concluding the Mercosur-EU trade deal) and U.S. for economic recovery, making BRICS a lower priority. South Africa faces domestic challenges that might limit its international activism. If Saudi Arabia feels BRICS membership jeopardizes its security ties with the U.S., it could slow-roll or limit its participation (already, reports indicated Riyadh was still “considering” the formal invitation in late 2024) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). This scenario would see BRICS more as a forum for dialogue than action – akin to a larger Non-Aligned Movement 2.0. The U.S. would prefer this outcome, as it could then deal with each country on its own merits without confronting a united front. Some Western skeptics of BRICS argue exactly this: that “BRICS started out as mostly an academic curiosity” and remains incoherent compared to the tight-knit G7 (BRICS vs. G7: Can They Truly Be Compared? – claws). If they are right, the U.S. might have to worry less about BRICS per se, and more about the two main challengers (China and Russia) outside of that context.
Areas of Cooperation: It’s also important to note that U.S. and BRICS interests are not universally opposed. Global issues like climate change, pandemics, and terrorism require cooperation. In 2024, there were instances of U.S.–BRICS collaboration: for example, all BRICS members supported the establishment of a Climate Club for sustainable initiatives at the G20, aligning with U.S. climate goals. India and the U.S. worked together on pandemic preparedness (through Quad) which complements efforts in BRICS. Even on Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa have proposed peace dialogues, which, while not embraced by the U.S. at present, could become valuable if a stalemate persists. Some experts suggest the U.S. should find ways to partner with BRICS institutions – for instance, co-financing infrastructure projects via the NDB or cooperating on African development programs – to build goodwill and trust. If trust improves, it might defuse the narrative of systemic rivalry. One Chinese analyst, Haibin Niu, wrote that BRICS sees itself as “a primary channel for the Global South…for more inclusive and sustainable governance” (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils), and noted that China, India, and Brazil have historically supported global South development. This indicates common ground where the U.S. could also contribute, rather than viewing it as competition. In a positive-sum scenario, BRICS and Western-led initiatives might even coordinate – for example, aligning an African railway project with both BRI and PGII funding, or jointly funding vaccine production in the developing world. Such cooperation would require a major shift in trust, but it is not inconceivable if leaders prioritize global public goods over zero-sum thinking.

Outlook

As of early 2025, the geopolitical balance between the United States and the BRICS bloc hangs in a fluid equilibrium. The trends of the past year – BRICS expansion, war in Ukraine, great-power competition – have all served to reinforce the desire of BRICS countries to act collectively, yet also exposed the very real limits of their unity. The U.S. remains the preeminent military power and an indispensable economic partner to many BRICS members, but it no longer enjoys uncontested global dominance. We are likely to see a prolonged period of “strategic competition” in which the U.S. and leading BRICS powers like China and Russia jockey for influence in third regions (Africa, Latin America, the Middle East), woo neutral states, and try to set international norms – all while avoiding direct war with each other.

Both sides have publicly downplayed wanting a new Cold War, and indeed the world of 2025 is more interdependent and multipolar than the bi-polar era of the 20th century. U.S. officials acknowledge differences among BRICS and will seek to peel off partners on a case-by-case basis with diplomacy and incentives (BRICS divisions re-emerge ahead of critical expansion debate | Reuters) (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council). BRICS leaders, for their part, often speak of “not forcing countries to choose sides” and stress themes of sovereignty and development, trying to draw a contrast with what they portray as Western hegemonism. As one South African commentary put it, Pretoria views BRICS “not as a counterpoint to the United States or…G7, but as a contributor to a more…inclusive global order.” (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council) (BRICS is doubling its membership. Is the bloc a new rival for the G7? – Atlantic Council) The rhetoric of inclusivity vs exclusivity will thus be a key battleground: if the U.S. is seen as respecting and empowering rising powers, BRICS might remain a constructive partner; if not, BRICS could become more explicitly a counter-West force.

Ultimately, the evolution of U.S.–BRICS relations will be shaped by leadership choices and external shocks. A change in leadership in any major country (e.g. the 2024 U.S. election, or future elections in India, Brazil, South Africa) could alter policy trajectories. Unexpected crises – a financial meltdown, a geopolitical clash, a global health emergency – could either pull the U.S. and BRICS together or drive them further apart. Think tanks like the Atlantic Council note that “as this year’s summit offered no proposals on reshaping the order,” BRICS is not yet a coherent counterweight (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). However, others like CFR’s Council of Councils warn that ignoring the bloc’s message is perilous: “Rather than seeing it as a propaganda plot… the West needs to see it as a wake-up call.” (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils). The coming years will show whether mutual interests can temper strategic rivalry, or whether ideological and power competition will deepen the divide.

Conclusion

The geopolitical dynamics between the United States and the BRICS nations in 2025 are complex and nuanced. Politically, BRICS is asserting a vision of multipolarity and greater global South agency, which challenges (but need not irrevocably undermine) the U.S.-led order. Economically, there is significant interdependence even amid efforts at de-dollarization and sanctions evasion – highlighting that outright decoupling is neither easy nor entirely desirable for either side. Militarily, while the U.S. retains robust alliances and superior power projection, BRICS members are coordinating just enough to complicate U.S. dominance, all while avoiding formal anti-U.S. security pacts.

Official statements reflect this careful balancing: Washington affirms it does not view BRICS as an enemy and seeks partnership where possible (BRICS divisions re-emerge ahead of critical expansion debate | Reuters), even as it fortifies its own coalitions. BRICS leaders proclaim they are not against the West per se (BRICS divisions re-emerge ahead of critical expansion debate | Reuters), even as they decry Western “hegemony” and build alternative ties. Expert analysis suggests that the future could swing either way – towards managed competition with selective collaboration, or towards greater polarization. The most likely near-term outcome is a continued modulated rivalry: the U.S. will engage bilateral relations to its advantage (strengthening ties with amenable BRICS members), and BRICS will function as a loose coordination mechanism giving its members bargaining power in the international arena (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? | Council on Foreign Relations).

In practical terms, we can expect the U.S. to keep pursuing common ground (for instance, on climate initiatives or infrastructure development) to avoid ceding all leadership to BRICS in the Global South. At the same time, core strategic disputes – democracy vs autocracy narratives, human rights criticisms, spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and East Asia – will persist, as these are driven by fundamental differences in values and interests between the U.S. and rivals like China and Russia. The inclusion of new BRICS members who are U.S. partners (like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt) could either serve as a bridge moderating the bloc’s stance, or as a sign of U.S. partners hedging away – the U.S. will surely work to ensure it’s more the former than the latter.

As one commentary succinctly noted: “The power of emerging countries and the Global South continues to grow. It is time for the West to determine how to rebuild the rules-based global order, not just oppose the BRICS.” (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) (The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative | Council of Councils) In 2025, the U.S.–BRICS relationship is a testament to a changing world – one in which dialogue and compromise, rather than confrontation, will yield the most stability. The next chapters of this relationship will depend on how both sides heed this lesson.

Sources: (Detailed inline citations provided throughout the report)

Geopolitical balance between the United States and the BRICS bloc hangs in a fluid equilibrium.